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ABSTRACT A semi-outsourcing privacy-preserving scheme is proposed in this paper for the IoT data collec-
tion named semi-outsourcing privacy-preserving (SOPP), which supports delegated identity authentication
for the IoT devices without revealing the transmitted data. Compared with other schemes that implement
the authentication based upon using trusted cloud services, the design of our scheme SOPP can achieve the
delegated authentication on untrusted public clouds while providing privacy-preserving data transmission.
Meanwhile, the implemented one-way authentication can reduce the communication cost for the IoT devices
(especially for the low-resource ones) to prolong their battery life. The performance of the SOPP scheme
is demonstrated for its use in the resource-constrained IoT devices and compared with a benchmark trusted
cloud scheme including one based upon certificates and an interactive (two-way) authentication scheme.
INDEX TERMS Privacy preservation, Internet of Things, cloud computing, communication security, public
key encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has been widely applied as an access infras-
tructure to serve IoT devices for uploading and processing
their collected data [1]. In cloud computing, the clouds can
work as a gateway (or an agent) to verify IoT devices’
identities and to collect (or aggregate) the data from IoT
devices. In this way, an increasing number of companies
are deploying IoT devices and clouds to gather health,
public utility, and transportation use information [2], [3].
Stake-holders are raising concerns about the data privacy
design requirements [4] and that the data security needs to
adapt to low ICT resource IoT devices that have limited com-
puting and energy resources [5], [6]. To satisfy the demands
of privacy preservation for IoT devices, trusted infrastructures
of cloud computing that preserve privacy are essential to be
built in large-scale IoT networks. The privacy-preservation
challenge or requirement is as follows. A user’s private stored
information needs to be kept confidential from the cloud
infrastructure provider and other users that have access to that
(multi-tenancy) cloud infrastructure.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Md. Arafatur Rahman.
Many small and medium-sized enterprises and organiza-
tions choose to deploy their services on untrusted public
clouds. The reason is that the cost of building a complete pri-
vate trusted cloud computing that contains enough comput-
ing resource and consummate security functions to support
a range of security operations in large-scale IoT networks
is not affordable for them. However, deploying services on
untrusted public clouds raises concerns about how to ensure
the data privacy and security during the data transmission
process [7]. In this way, a novel secure data privacy scheme
for IoT data transmission on untrusted clouds is proposed to
accommodate this scenario.
Generally, there are two steps in the data collection (trans-
mission) from IoT devices to clouds: authentication and data
transmission. In the authentication, the clouds should verify
the identity of the IoT device. If the IoT device’s identity
is valid, the clouds receive the uploaded data from the IoT
device then transmit the data to the data collector (control
center). The trusted private clouds have the permissions to
access all the data in the described two steps authentication
and data transmission, i.e. the clouds can verify the identity of
the IoT device, as well as check the integrity and the correct-
ness by decrypting the transported data from the IoT device
since the clouds are trusted and reliable [8]. However, the
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plain identity of the IoT device and plaintext data should not
be revealed to the untrusted public clouds to avoid personal
data leakage because the public clouds are regarded as a
multi-purpose and multi-user environment without reliable
measures to safeguard users’ data privacy [9].
Most of existing research focuses on data privacy and secu-
rity analysis in trusted clouds [8], [10]. In [11], a data man-
agement framework is proposed to convert, aggregate, clean,
and filter data on trusted clouds. However, the aforemen-
tioned framework uses centralized digitalized certificates to
verify users’ identities so that interactive dual authentication
can be achieved. It means the IoT device has to communicate
with the certificate authority and the cloud several times in
order to authenticate the connections and to transport the
data from the IoT device to the data collector. However, this
increases the computing consumption and network through-
put, whilst limiting their use for resource-constrained IoT
devices [12]. In [13], trusted clouds and PKI are applied to
IoT m-Health network, and clouds and act as an agent to
aggregate and transmit encrypted data from sensors. How-
ever, they do not consider the resource limitations of weaker
resource IoT devices and there are no related experiments
or any discussion about the cost of computation and wire-
less transmission in this paper. Reference [14] applies trusted
clouds to implement a similar agent structure in the service
layer named CMfg that can manage middleware and com-
putational resources in the clouds, but there is no security
consideration (e.g. access control, reliability and confiden-
tiality) in the design of CMfg to protect IoT devices’ data in
communications.
Research on addressing a stricter data privacy requirement
is limited for untrusted clouds. A homomorphic encryption
scheme for executing private queries on untrusted clouds
is presented in [15]. In [16], authors use ring signature
and computationally complex homomorphic authenticators
to provide a privacy sharing scheme for untrusted clouds.
However, the bilinear pairing used in homomorphism-related
cryptographic operations costs much more computational
resources when compared with the elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC) [17]. In summary, the aforementioned data secu-
rity schemes are cloud-centric and require intensive ICT
resources on public clouds, which are not suitable to be used
as a baseline to compare performance. Also, public cloud
schemes are more computationally complex compared with
a private cloud scheme. So the practical applicability of those
public cloud schemes in resource-constrained IoT devices
such as low CPU performance and limited power supply are
restricted.
Compared with existing schemes for trusted clouds
in [12]–[14], the novel security and privacy requirements for
SOPP data exchange are:
1) SOPP can be applied to untrusted public clouds
without exposing plaintext private data to the
clouds.
2) The authentication process is delegated to public clouds
to block invalid access, but the data decryption and
integrity validation are implemented at the data center
(semi-outsourcing).
3) According to the comparison with the interactive
authentication scheme from [11] and the homomor-
phic methods from [15], [16], our proposed SOPP
scheme’s design is based upon ECC and is imple-
mented as a one-way (non-interactive) authentication
strategy between untrusted public clouds and IoT
devices to decrease the throughput for IoT devices in
order to achieve a longer battery duration [18].
Compared with our original work [19], the improvements
of this paper are:
1) A systematic security model is constructed to guide
the scheme design and the elaboration of the proposed
scheme’s security in terms of different security require-
ments (authentication, confidentiality, and integrity).
2) A theoretical proof is illustrated formally to show
that SOPP can resist the one-wayness under a cho-
sen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) in the random oracle
model.
3) More detailed results from the comparative experi-
ments are demonstrated in the section IV.B to express
the better performance of SOPP in terms of time effi-
ciency and network throughput.
4) The proposed scheme SOPP is reconstructed carefully
with the amended parts of public parameters genera-
tion and data encryption to ensure the cryptographic
correctness.
The structure of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, the preliminaries for scheme construc-
tion are presented, such as the definition of the Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) assumption. In Section III,
the model and definitions used to illustrate our proposed
scheme SOPP are introduced. Then the proposed SOPP
scheme and performance of our scheme simulation are
included in Section IV. Security analysis is discussed in
Section V and the conclusion is presented in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE DIFFIE-HELLMAN (ECDH)
ASSUMPTION
ECDH assumption [20] is a computational problem on ellip-
tic curves that can be used in information exchange to ensure
data confidentiality in public key cryptography. Let Ep(a, b)
be a cryptographic secure elliptic curve. Any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A computes uvP with its advan-
tage: AdvECDHA,Ep(a,b) = Pr[c = uvP|u, v∈RZ
∗
p, c = A(P, uP,
vP)], where,P is a point onEp(a, b) and u, v∈RZ∗p. The ECDH
assumption can hold if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A, its advantage AdvECDHA,Ep(a,b) is negligible.
III. MODEL AND DEFINITION
A. SCHEME MODEL
In this section, we present our proposed scheme model and
the comparisonwith existing baselinemodels. There are three
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types of entity in the system, which are the IoT devices,
public (untrusted) clouds, and data center (also referred as
control center in some scenarios such as smart grids) respec-
tively. The system infrastructure is presented in Figure. 1.
FIGURE 1. The infrastructure of proposed SOPP scheme model.
Organisations and companies fully control and trust their
own data center. However, there are some cases where the
data center can be owned by or integrated into untrusted pub-
lic clouds. In this paper, we assume that clouds are separate
or independently managed, and the untrusted public cloud is
only used for data gathering and exchange, it is not used for
data management. Henceforth, it also implies an additional
IoT security data requirement which requires avoiding private
information leakage from the IoT device to the clouds and
from the clouds to the data center.
The schematic work phases of the SOPP scheme model are
described as follows. The first phase is used to broadcast the
public security parameters to all the entities from the private
data center, which share an identity list with the untrusted
public clouds at the same time. Note that all the elements of
the identity list are the IoT devices’ hashed identities. Then,
the IoT devices transport their hashed identities and encrypted
data to the untrusted public in the next phase, when the data
center collects data from the IoT devices. After receiving the
hashed identities and the encrypted data, the public clouds can
validate the identities of the data senders (the IoT devices) by
querying the identities in the identity list. If the IoT devices’
identities are valid, the untrusted public clouds will send the
corresponding encrypted data from the identified IoT devices
to the data center, otherwise, the data collection should be
aborted. In the last phase, the received encrypted data are
decrypted by the private data center, the data integrity is
checked to avoid tampering, then if intact the plain data is
saved for processing.
B. MODEL COMPARISON
Compared with the baseline model ‘‘data center - agents
(trusted clouds) - IoT devices’’, the highlight of our scheme
model is in obviates the need to use the trusted clouds to
realize data privacy preservation. Since the cost of leasing
public clouds is much less than the expense of building
trusted private clouds, our scheme can ensure data privacy
for IoT data transmission at a lower cost for the infrastructure
construction.
Compared with another general model ‘‘data center -
IoT devices’’, our model does not require us to deploy a
large-scale data center to process data and satisfy security
demands (e.g. authentication, validation, and cyber-attacks
defense) since the untrusted public clouds are strong enough
to assume a part of security work, i.e. cyber-attacks preven-
tion (detection) and the authentication work can be delegated
to untrusted public clouds. Meanwhile, applying our scheme
can ensure data privacy when the IoT devices’ data is trans-
ported via untrusted public clouds. Therefore, the companies
and organizations only need to construct a small-scale data
center for data validation and storage and lease the public
clouds for access control without any private data leakage
from IoT devices when deploying our scheme so that again
the construction expense could be decreased.
C. SOPP SCHEME DEFINITION
The propose scheme SOPP consists of the following five
phases:
1) SETUP(λ)
This algorithm uses the security parameter λ to generate the
public parameter pp.
2) KEYINITIALISE(pp)
This phase is used to initialize all the required public keys
(pk) and private keys (sk) based upon the public parameter
pp for the next phases.
3) ENCRYPT(pp,M, ID,pk)
The algorithm encrypts the plaintext M and the IoT device’s
identity ID with the public parameter pp and the public key
pk then outputs the ciphertext C .
4) AUTHENTICATION(pp,C, sk)
The public clouds decrypt the identity part of the ciphertext
C with sk (shared by the data center) then transfer the data
part C ′⊂C to the data center if a successful validation of the
identity of the data sender occurs.
5) DECRYPT(pp,C ′, sk)
The data center decrypts the encrypted data C ′ with the
private key sk to retrieve the sent data M then validate the
integrity of M with this algorithm.
D. CORRECTNESS DEFINITION
The scheme is correct if for any pp ←Setup(λ), and
(pk, sk)←KeyInitialise(pp), the following conditions hold.
1. For any identity ID, the public clouds can always retrieve
the identity f (ID) viaAuthentication(Encrypt(pp,M , ID, pk),
sk), where f can be any secure one-way function.
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2. For any plaintext M , Decrypt(Encrypt(pp,M , ID, pk),
sk)) = M always holds.
E. SECURITY DEFINITION
In this section, the adversary is defined at first to illustrate
the definition of OW-CCA (i.e. one-wayness under a chosen
ciphertext attack) security for SOPP.
1) ADVERSARY
Formally, the adversary defined for the security of our pro-
posed scheme SOPP is:
• Type-I adversary: In the Authentication phase, the adver-
sary cannot retrieve the plain message from the challenge
ciphertext.
2) OW-CCA SECURITY
The definition of OW-CCA security model with the Type-I
adversary for the Authentication phase in SOPP is as follows.
Game 1 A1 is the given Type-I adversary, and the target
device’s index is t (16t6n). The game 1 between the chal-
lenger C and A1 is operated as follows:
• Setup
C firstly generates the public parameter pp via running
the algorithm Setup. Then, C generates n public and pri-
vate key pairs (pki, ski) (16i6n) via running the algorithm
KeyGenerate. The generated pp and all pki are given to the
adversary A1.
• Queries
The following queries can be requested by A1 for polyno-
mial times.
1. Key retrieve query(i): C responds with the private
key ski.
2. Authentication query(i,C): C returns the trapdoor Ti to
recover f (ID).
3. Decryption query(i,C ′): C decrypts C ′ with ski via
running the algorithmDecrypt(C ′, ski), and respondswith the
output message.
• Challenge
C picks a message M∗ randomly, then computes the chal-
lenge ciphertextC∗ = Encrypt(M∗, pkt ) and finally responds
the challenge ciphertext C∗.
• Constraints
(1) The target device’s index t is not allowed to appear in
the above Key retrieve query.
(2) The target device’s index t and the challenge ciphertext
C∗ is not allowed to appear in the above Decryption query.
• Guess
A1 can win the game if its output M∗′ satisfies the condi-
tion M∗′ = M∗.
Now, the advantage of A1 could be defined as:
AdvOW−CCAA1 (λ) = Pr[M
∗
= M∗′].
Definition 1 (OW-CCA Security): The proposed scheme
SOPP is OW-CCA secure if the advantage AdvOW−CCAA1 (λ) of
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA1 is negligible.
3) AUTHENTICATION
The public clouds can check the identity part C ′⊂C to block
the data transmission without the valid identity after receiv-
ing the encrypted data C from the IoT device.
4) CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality of our scheme is to ensure that the
untrusted public clouds cannot decrypt the plaintext M from
the encrypted data C in the Authentication phase. To be
specific, ∀M ∈ {0, 1}∗,C = f (M ), any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm B computesM with its advantage
AdvB = Pr[c = M |c = B(pp,C, sk)] < ε,
where M is plaintext data, C is encrypted data by the algo-
rithm f that transmitted from the IoT device via the public
clouds, pp and sk denote the public parameters and the known
private key respectively in the phase Authentication, and ε
represents a negligible probability.
5) INTEGRITY
After decrypting the encrypted data C ′ received from the
untrusted public clouds, the data center can check the
integrity of the decrypted dataM to avoid invalid data manip-
ulation by the attackers in the transmission from the untrusted
public clouds to the data center.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present our proposed new SOPP scheme
and demonstrate its validity. The experimental validations
are analyzed by comparing the time cost and communi-
cation cost. Note that we use non-interactive (one-way)
authentication scheme between IoT devices and public clouds
(untrusted), so the two-way authentication is superfluous,
which results in reducing the commutation cost between
low-resource IoT devices and public clouds.
A. THE PROPOSED SOPP SCHEME
1) SETUP(λ)
This algorithm uses the security parameter λ to generate the
public parameters pp in five steps.
1. Pick a cryptographic secure elliptic curve group G with
a base point G on the curve, where the order of G is p.
2. Select three cryptographic secure hash functions: H1 :
{0, 1}∗−→ {0, 1}λ, H2 : G−→ {0, 1}2λ and H3 : G3 ×
{0, 1}2λ−→ {0, 1}λ.
3. Choose a symmetric encrypting and decrypting
algorithm. Note that the selected algorithm to describe
our SOPP scheme is the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [20].
4. The data center calculates the hashed identity HID =
H1(ID) for all IoT devices in the network to create an identity
list including all IoT devices’ hashed identities as the ele-
ments, List −HID, then shares List −HID with the untrusted
public clouds.
5. Output pp = (G, p,G,H1,H2,H3,AES)
87172 VOLUME 7, 2019
X. Zhang et al.: Provable Semi-Outsourcing Privacy-Preserving Scheme for Data Transmission From IoT Devices
2) KEYINITIALISE(pp)
This algorithm randomly picks two numbers a, b∈RZ∗p and
calculates the key pair:
(pk, sk1, sk2) = ((A = aG,B = bG), (a), (b))
The public keys A and B can be broadcast in the whole
network. However, the private key sk2 = b is only shared
with the public clouds, meanwhile, the private key, sk1 = a,
is kept such that it is known only by the data center secretly.
3) ENCRYPT(pp,M, ID,pk)
For the given sent data M∈{0, 1}λ and the identity of the
IoT device ID∈{0, 1}λ, the algorithm outputs the encrypted
ciphertext C = (C1,C2,C3,C4) via the following steps:
1. Compute HM = H1(M ),HID = H1(ID).
2. Use AES to encrypt dataM with the keyHID then get the
ciphertext AESHID (M ). For decrypting AESHID (M ) to recover
the plaintextM , AES ′HID is defined as the decryption process:
M = AES ′HID (AESHID (M )).
3. Pick two random numbers r1, r2∈RZ∗p then compute
C1 = r1G
C2 = r2G
C3 = AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A)
C4 = HID⊕H3(r2B,C1,C2,C3).
4) AUTHENTICATION(pp,C, sk2)
The public clouds receive the ciphertext C and computes
C4⊕H3(bC2,C1,C2,C3) to recover HID. Then, the public
clouds check if HID belongs to the hashed identity list List −
HID. IfHID∈List−HID, the public clouds allow the transmis-
sion to send the ciphertext C ′ = (HID,C1,C2,C3) to the data
center; if HID /∈List −HID, the public clouds deny the request
for data transmission.
5) DECRYPT(pp,C ′, sk1)
The data center can execute the next steps to retrieve the plain-
text M from the received ciphertext C ′ = (HID,C1,C2,C3):
1. Recover AESHID (HM ||M ) via computing
C3⊕H2(aC1).
2. Decrypt AESHID (HM ||M ) with the key HID
HM ||M = AES ′HID (AESHID (HM ||M )).
3. If H1(M ) = HM holds, this algorithm outputs M ;
otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
The entire workflow of this proposed scheme is depicted
in the Figure. 2.
B. PERFORMANCE
The performance of the proposed scheme SOPP is compared
with the scheme in [11] used as a baseline in terms of two
aspects: time efficiency and network throughput. To be spe-
cific, the time consumption of the data transportation over
FIGURE 2. The workflow of the proposed scheme SOPP.
Wi-Fi and the local computation in the IoT device is com-
pared. Then, the network throughput including the quantity
and the size of the transmitted packages in the two schemes
will be evaluated. To build up the experiments, the low-
resource IoT hub, Raspberry Pi 2 [21], is selected as the
IoT device. Meanwhile, a conventional laptop with an Intel
processor (3.30GHz) is used to perform as an node in the
public clouds.
We implement SOPP and the scheme in [11] based upon
MIRACL [22], a cryptography SDK that can support all the
required operations on elliptic curves and provide the needed
hash functions and cryptographic algorithms. All the secure
parameters and implemented experiments use an equiva-
lent cryptographic security level (128-bit) [23] for both two
schemes. Then the evaluation of the transmitted packages’
quantity and size is implemented based upon TCP socket
communication. The transmitted data size is set to 128 Bytes,
and the used certificate size is 1024 Bytes (1 KB). In the
experiments, we choose AES-256 for data encryption and
decryption with SHA-256 as the hash algorithm. For public
key operations, the elliptic curve we use is secp160.
1) TIME EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
For comparison of the time efficiency, the experiment is
executed 5 rounds with 10 times in each round. The average
time cost (for each round) of transporting data over Wi-Fi
is shown in Figure. 3. Compared with the time cost of the
scheme in [11], the reduction of the time cost in SOPP is
about 75% on average.Meanwhile, the average total time cost
including the time consumption of both local computation
and data transmission is depicted in the Figure. 4. Although
the time cost of local computation in SOPP is twice that of the
scheme in [11], the total time cost of SOPP is around 60% less
than that of the scheme in [11] because the data size required
for authentication in our scheme SOPP is much smaller to
lead to the much lower time cost for data transmission over
Wi-Fi when compared with [11].
2) COMMUNICATION THROUGHPUT COMPARISON
In this experiment, the transmitted data size is set to be
256 bytes and 512 bytes respectively to obtain the average
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FIGURE 3. The comparison of time cost for data transmission over Wi-Fi.
FIGURE 4. The comparison of the total time cost for local computing and
data transmission.
result (over 100 times), which is determined by monitoring
the network throughput. For each data size, the average size
and quantity of the sent packages by the IoT device (Rasp-
berry Pi 2) for data transmission are summarized in Table. 1.
Compared with the package size and quantity of the scheme
in [11], the size and the quantity of the sent packages are
reduced by around 45% and 60% respectively because of the
less required data used for authentication in SOPP.
To summarize: the performance experiments demonstrate
that our scheme SOPP costs more time for local computing
when compared with the scheme in [11]. However, the com-
parisons indicate that the proportion of the time cost for local
computation (about 20% in SOPP and 5% in [11]) is much
smaller than the proportion of the time cost for data transmis-
sion, therefore, the effect of the time cost of local comput-
ing is much less important. Meanwhile, compared with the
scheme in [11], SOPP costs less time for data transmission,
TABLE 1. A comparison of average data quantity and total data size in
each data transmission.
while the total transported data size is significantly decreased
to achieve a lower network throughput in the experiments.
Hence, the resource-constrained IoT devices can save more
energy and lead to a longer battery life [12]. In conclusion,
we state that the proposed scheme SOPP is more appropriate
for data collection when these use resource-constrained IoT
devices as data providers.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Based upon the security definition (Section III.E), the correct-
ness of SOPP is demonstrated at first, then the cryptanalysis
for the OW-CCA security of the proposed scheme is illus-
trated in the next section. The authentication, confidentiality
and the integrity of SOPP are analyzed briefly as the last three
parts in this section.
A. CORRECTNESS
1) AUTHENTICATION
In the Authentication phase, the public clouds can recover
HID via computing C4⊕H3(bC2,C1,C2,C3) based upon the








When the data center receives C ′ = (HID,C1,C2,C3) from
the public clouds, the data center can retrieve encrypted data
AESHID (HM ||M ) via computing C3⊕H2(aC1) based upon the
algorithm Decrypt in Section IV.A.5).
C3 ⊕ H2(aC1)
= AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A)⊕H2(aC1)
= AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A)⊕H2(ar1G)
= AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A)⊕H2(r1(aG))
= AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A)⊕H2(r1A)
= AESHID (HM ||M )
Then the data center can decrypt AESHID (HM ||M ) with the
AES key HID∈C ′ to get the plaintext HM ||M .
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B. OW-CCA SECURITY
Theorem 1: According to Definition 1, our proposed scheme
SOPP is OW-CCA secure based upon the ECDH assumption
against a Type-I adversary in the random oracle model.
To be specific, let H1, H2 and H3 be three random oracles
and A1 be a Type-I adversary with the advantage AdvA1
against our proposed scheme. Hypothetically, A1 requests
a total of QH2 > 0 queries to the oracle H2, then there is
an algorithm E that can solve the ECDH problem with the




Proof: The selected elliptic curve Ep(a, b) with cryp-
tographic security, the group G is based upon Ep(a, b) and
the three points on the curve (G, µG, υG)∈Ep(a, b) consist
of an instance of the ECDH problem and the target device’s
index is defined as t (16t6n). E aims to compute δ∗ = µυG
via executing A1 as the subroutine. Next, E and A1 play the
game defined by Game 1.
• Setup
E firstly generates the public parameter pp and then sends
pp to A1. After that, E operates the algorithm KeyIni-
tialise (Section IV.A.2) to generate n public and private key
pairs (pki, sk i1, sk
i
2) (16i6n, i 6=t). In this process, the target
device’s public key is defined as pkt = (At ,Bt ), At =
µtG, Bt = υtG, where µt , υt∈RZ∗p is picked randomly. All
pki are revealed to the adversary A1. Finally, E initializes
three empty lists ListH1 , ListH2 and ListH3 , and updates them
continuously in response to random oracle queries. If the
same input is asked multiple times, the same answer will be
returned as well.
• Queries
E can respond to the queries requested byA1 in the follow-
ing ways:
1. QueryH1 (γ1): E picks δ1∈{0, 1}λ randomly and stores a
new item (γ1, δ1) into ListH1 and returns δ1 as the answer.
2. QueryH2 (γ2): E picks δ2∈{0, 1}2λ randomly and stores a
new item (γ2, δ2) into ListH2 and returns δ2 as the answer.
3. QueryH3 (γ3,C1,C2,C3): E picks δ3∈{0, 1}λ randomly
and stores a new item (γ3,C1,C2,C3, δ3) into ListH3 and
returns δ3 as the answer.
4. Key retrieve query(i): E sends the private key sk i1 =
(µi), sk i1 = (υi) to A1.
5. Authentication query(i,C): E returns the trapdoor
Ti = H3(υiC2,C1,C2,C3) to recover HID, where
C = (C1,C2,C3,C4).
6. Decryption query(i,C ′): The definition of parameter C ′
isC ′ = (C1,C2,C3), and there is a conditional branch caused
by i to be discussed.
• i = t: For each item (γ2, δ2) in the ListH2 , E performs the
following operations.
(i) Compute AESHID (HM ||M ) = C3⊕δ2 and HID =
C4⊕H3(υtC2,C1,C2,C3);
(ii) Compute M = AES ′HID (AESHID (HM ||M ));
(iii) If H1(M ) = HM holds, E returns M to A1. If there is
no item in the ListH2 satisfies the above condition, E returns
⊥ to A1.
• i 6=t: E runs algorithm Decrypt(pp,C, sk i1), and then
sends the output to A1 as the answer.
• Challenge
E picks two random numbers, one is r1∈RZ∗p and the
other one is r∗∈{0, 1}2λ. Then, E generates a random



















Note that the process of decrypting C∗3 is r
∗
⊕H2(µC∗1 ) =
r∗⊕H2(µυG) = r∗⊕H2(δ∗) by the definition of Decrypt .
Finally, E sends the ciphertext C∗ to the adversary A1.
• Constraints
(1) The target device’s index t is not allowed to appear in
the Key retrieve query;
(2) The target device’s index t and the challenge ciphertext




∈{0, 1}λ to response the challenge from E .
And at the same time, E picks a random item (γ2, δ2) from the
ListH2 as the solution to the above given instance of ECDH
problem.
• Analysis
We first define an event E that means the adversary A1
issues a query H2(δ∗) at a time point during the described
game. Apparently, δ∗ is at least in one item of ListH2 at the
end of this game if E happened.
However, if E does not happen, we can state that Pr[M∗ =
M∗
′
|¬E] = 12λ . Furthermore, based upon the definition of
Type-I adversary (A1), AdvA16Pr[M∗ = M∗
′
] holds. Then,
we can present the following derivation.
Pr[M∗ = M∗
′






































In conclusion, at the end of the game between E and
A1, the probability of δ∗ in the item(s) of ListH2 is at least
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AdvA1 −
1
2λ . For E , the probability of generating the correct
answer M∗
′





2λ ). Therefore, the probability AdvA1 is negli-
gible when the ECDH assumption is intact. 
C. AUTHENTICATION
The public clouds first recover HID from the received data in
the Authentication phase. If there is nomatched identity when
HID is searched for in the identity list List−HID, the integrity
check indicates that the identity of the data source (the IoT
device) is invalid or the data has been corrupted. Since HID is
recovered fromC4, andC4 is generated fromHID,C1,C2,C3,
HID decrypted from C4 = HID⊕H3(r2B,C1,C2,C3) would
not be found in the list List − HID if HID,C1,C2, or
C3 is forged in transmission. Therefore, the calculation
dependency between C4 and (HID,C1,C2,C3) can ensure
the invalid transmission can be found and is blocked in
Authentication.
D. CONFIDENTIALITY
The focus of our scheme’s confidentiality is to ensure the
untrusted public clouds cannot decrypt the encrypted data
part C3 of C in the Authentication process by the definition
in Section III.B.3).
After receiving the encrypted data C from the IoT device,
the public clouds can only retrieve HID with the algorithm
Authentication in Section IV.A.4). If the public clouds attempt
to decryptC3, they need an algorithm to calculate a number r∗
equal to a or r1 (because AESHID (HM ||M ) = C3⊕H2(aC1) =
C3⊕H2(r1A)), where the public key (A,B) and the ciphertext
C are known. However, the public clouds have no probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithm as a subroutine in B to use
G,C1 = r1G,A = aG to calculate r∗ = a (or r1) based upon
the ECDH assumption. Hence, the advantage of the untrusted
public clouds
AdvB = Pr[c = M |c = B(pp,C, sk2)]
= Pr[c = a∨c = r1|c = B(pp,C3,HID, sk2)]
is negligible for generating r∗ to recover M from C success-
fully, which means the confidentiality ofM can be secured in
the phase Authentication.
E. INTEGRITY
In our proposed scheme SOPP, the data integrity means to
ensure that the transmitted data can be tamper-proof in the
data transmission from public clouds to the data center. Here,
we discuss two potential attacks during the data transmission.
a) The encrypted data C3 = AESHID (HM ||M )⊕H2(r1A) or
the identityHID from theAuthentication phase is manipulated
by the attacker during data transmission.
According to the Decrypt phase, C3 can be decrypted with
the AES decryption algorithm to retrieve the plaintextM and
HM . However, if C3 or HID (the key for AES decryption)
is changed, the AES decryption algorithm cannot output
the correct HM ||M . This is because AES encryption and
decryption are symmetric, which means even if there is only
one incorrect bit in C3 or HID, the encryption or decryption
result will be wrong. In this situation, the hash validation in
theDecrypt phase will fail, i.e.,H1(M )6=HM holds because of
the incorrect M and HM . Therefore, we can state that SOPP
can take advantage of the integrity validation to block the
manipulated data by the attacker between the untrusted public
clouds and the data center.
b) The attacker can control the untrusted public clouds and
the identity list List − HID has been disclosed.
Since the public clouds have been controlled, the attacker
can recover the IoT device’s identity HID from the received
ciphertext C = (C1,C2,C3,C4) in the Authentication phase.
Furthermore, the attacker can also substitute a forged invalid
identity or another valid identity in the identity list List−HID
for HID. On the other hand, it is possible for the attacker
to modify the ciphertext C3∈C directly under this situation.
However, the probability for the attacker to decrypt C3 is still
negligible based upon our security analysis in Section V.B
and V.D. Regardless of the validity of the selected identity
H∗ID and the forged C
∗
3 by the attacker, when the data cen-
ter receives the encrypted data C ′∗ = (H∗ID,C1,C2,C
∗
3 ),
the data center can use the algorithm Decrypt to validate the
integrity of the decrypted dataM∗ and H∗M from C
∗ to detect
falsification because of the analysis illustrated in a). Hence,
SOPP can ensure data integrity and avoid the plain data M
to be leaked when public clouds are manipulated by the
attacker.
Overall, according to the above security analysis, when
attacks occur during the data transmission from the IoT
device to the data center via the untrusted public clouds,
SOPP can provide sufficient safeguards to ensure the
confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted private
data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new privacy-preserving transmis-
sion scheme, Semi-Outsourcing Privacy Preserving (SOPP),
for use in data transmission scenarios from IoT devices. Com-
pared with original work constructed with PKI and trusted
clouds, the use of trusted private clouds with high construc-
tion expense is not needed to deploy SOPP to ensure the
security and privacy in data transmission. The authentica-
tion and the decryption (including the integrity validation)
are divided (semi-outsourcing) to adapt to a more general
cloud architecture for data acquisition from IoT devices,
where the data center is separated from untrusted public
clouds. Meanwhile, SOPP is more suitable to be deployed
in resource-constrained IoT devices because it can lower
the network throughput and time cost in data transmission.
Therefore, SOPP is more economical and practical for use by
small and medium-sized enterprises and organizations that
cannot afford the cost for constructing large-scale trusted
clouds but instead tend to take advantage of untrusted public
clouds as part of their Information Communication Technol-
ogy (ICT) service infrastructure.
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